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加强提高国际原子能机构核查有关国家是否在从事非法核活动的能力对加强不扩散体制至为关键。国际原子能机构的附加议定书——它允许进行更严格的突击检查——应当通过共同协调的努力使之在世界通用，以说服拒不参加的主要国家加入其中。
Our experience with Iraq’s nuclear program before the 1991 Gulf War showed that the IAEA’s rights and resources needed upgrading. The additional protocol is the embodiment of those lessons. A failure to make this protocol the global standard means the world will have failed to heed the lessons of history at our collective peril. The IAEA should make full use of existing verification authorities, including special inspections. But it should also be given new authorities, including the ability to investigate suspected nuclear weapons-related activities even when no nuclear materials are present. And if we expect the IAEA to be a bulwark of the nonproliferation regime, we must give it the resources necessary to do the job.
我们在1991年海湾战争前在伊拉克核项目方面的经验教训说明，需要提升国际原子能机构的权力并增加它的资源。附加议定书是汲取这些教训的体现。如不使此议定书成为全球通行的标准，则意味着世界未能吸取历史教训，其后果将危害我们所有人。国际原子能机构应当充分利用现有核查授权，包括进行特别核查的授权。但也应当授予它新的权力，包括即使在没有当场发现核材料的情况下也能调查与核武器相关的嫌疑活动。如果我们期望国际原子能机构成为不扩散体制的一个堡垒，我们就必须让它获得做好这项工作的必要资源。
Improving the IAEA’s ability to detect safeguard violations is not enough. Potential violators must know that if they are caught, they will pay a high price. That is certainly not the case today. Despite American efforts, the international community’s record of enforcing compliance in recent years is unacceptable. Compliance mechanisms and procedures must be improved. We should consider adopting automatic penalties for violation of safeguards agreements; for example, suspending all international nuclear cooperation, or IAEA technical cooperation projects until compliance has been restored.
仅仅提高国际原子能机构核查违反保障机制做法的能力还不够。试图违规的国家必须清楚，它们一旦被发现，将付出高昂的代价。但今天的情况显然不是这样。尽管有美国的努力，但近几年来国际社会确保执行保障机制的记录仍是不能接受的。对遵守机制与程序必须作出改进。针对违反保障机制协议的行为，我们应该考虑采用自动惩罚措施。例如，中断所有的国际核合作或国际原子能机构技术合作项目，直至恢复遵守协议为止。
And because the role of the Security Council is so important on compliance issues, we are working to rebuild the consensus among the five permanent members on NPT enforcement.
鉴于安理会在遵守协议问题上的作用如此重要，我们正在努力在五个常任理事国中就执行《不扩散核武器条约》问题重新建立共识。
We must also use financial and legal tools to better disrupt illicit proliferation networks. This will mean tightening controls on transshipment, a key source of illicit trade, and strengthening Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology. A reinvigorated nonproliferation regime should enable countries, especially developing countries, to enjoy the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy, while providing incentives for them not to build their own enrichment or reprocessing facilities. These facilities are inherently capable of producing both fuel for nuclear reactors and the fissile cores of nuclear weapons and should not be allowed to proliferate.
我们还须运用金融和法律手段，更有效地瓦解从事扩散的非法网络。这将意味着更严格地控制转运——这是非法贸易的重要来源，并加强核供应国集团（Nuclear Suppliers Group）对浓缩与再加工技术转让的限制。一个更有力的不扩散体制应该使各国——尤其是发展中国家——能够享受和平利用核能的好处，同时为它们带来不建造自身铀浓缩与再加工设施的种种好处。这些设施的性质注定它们既能生产核反应堆燃料，也能生产核武裂变材料，因此不应增多。
But we need to ensure that states have access to nuclear fuel, a right guaranteed under the NPT. The best way to accomplish this goal is by expanding fuel cycle options. Multilateral fuel supply assurances, international fuel banks, and spent fuel repositories can enhance the confidence of states embarking on or expanding their nuclear power programs. These initiatives will encourage countries to pursue legitimate civil nuclear plans without assuming the risk and expense of constructing their own fuel cycle facilities. So we will support international fuel banks and effective fuel service arrangements as key components of our nonproliferation policy.
但我们需要确保各个国家都可以获得核燃料，这是《不扩散核武器条约》予以保证的权利。实现这个目标的最好办法是扩大燃料循环的各种途径。多边的燃料供应保证、国际燃料库和废燃料储存库能增强正在开展或扩大核电力项目国家的信心。这些积极措施将鼓励各国实施合理的民用核计划，而不必承担建造自身燃料循环设施的风险与费用。因此，我们将把支持国际燃料库和有效的燃料服务安排作为我们不扩散政策的重要内容。
Now, we cannot divorce nonproliferation efforts from the challenge of reducing existing nuclear arsenals, both are part of the core bargain of the NPT. All countries face a common danger from nuclear weapons, but the nuclear arms states, and especially the United States and Russia, have an obligation to reduce their weapons stockpiles. And the Obama Administration is actively pursuing these steps. We are negotiating an agreement with the Russians that will succeed the soon-to-expire START treaty, and significantly reduce the nuclear forces of both sides. It will also set the stage for even deeper cuts in the future.
然而，我们无法把不扩散的努力与减少现有核武库的挑战截然分开。两者都是《不扩散核武器条约》的重要条件。所有国家都面临来自核武器的共同危险，但有核国家——尤其是美国和俄罗斯——有责任减少各自的武器库存，而奥巴马政府正在积极采取这些步骤。我们正在与俄罗斯方面谈判一项协议，接替即将到期的《削减战略武器条约》（START Treaty），并大幅度削减双方的核军备。它也将为今后作出更大削减创造条件。
Let me be clear: the United States is interested in a new START agreement because it will bolster our national security. We and Russia deploy far more nuclear weapons than we need or could ever potentially use without destroying our ways of life. We can reduce our stockpiles of nuclear weapons without posing any risk to our homeland, our deployed troops or our allies.
我要明确表示，美国有意在《削减战略武器条约》后达成一项新协议是因为它将增强国家安全。我们和俄罗斯部署的核武器远远超过了我们的需要，远远超过万一动用而又不给我们的生活方式造成毁灭的程度。我们能够做到在不给国土、驻军和盟国构成危险的同时，减少核库存。
Clinging to nuclear weapons in excess of our security needs does not make the United States safer. And the nuclear status quo is neither desirable nor sustainable. It gives other countries the motivation or the excuse to pursue their own nuclear options.
继续保持超出我们安全所需的核武器不会让美国更安全。目前的核局面既不可取，也无法持续。它使其他国家有动机、有借口发展它们各自的核方案。
The right way to reduce our excess nuclear forces is in parallel with Russia. Verifiable mutual reductions through a new START treaty will help us build trust and avoid surprises. We are working hard to ensure that the new agreement will continue to allow for inspections and other mechanisms that allow us to build confidence. We are under no illusions that the START agreement will persuade Iran and North Korea to end their illicit nuclear activities. But it will demonstrate that the United States is living up to its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligation to work toward nuclear disarmament. In doing so, it will help convince the rest of the international community to strengthen nonproliferation controls and tighten the screws on states that flout that their nonproliferation commitments.
减少我们过剩核力量的正确途径是与俄罗斯齐头并进。通过一项新的削减战略武器条约实现可核查的共同削减将有助于我们建立信任，避免意外。我们正在作出积极努力，确保新协议将继续包含能够让我们建立信心的检查和其他机制。我们绝不幻想新的削减战略武器条约会说服伊朗和北韩结束它们的非法核活动。但是，它将表明美国奉行《不扩散核武器条约》的义务，在为核裁军作出努力。这样做也将有助于说服国际社会其他成员加强不扩散控制，对那些无视其不扩散承诺的国家给与更有力的钳制。
For the same reason, the United States seeks to begin negotiations as soon as possible on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty with appropriate monitoring and verification provisions. A universal FMCT will halt the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes, capping the size of existing arsenals, and reducing the risk that terrorist groups will one day gain access to stockpiles of fissile materials.
基于同样的原因，美国在争取尽快就制定一项含有相应监督与核查条款的《裂变材料禁产条约》展开谈判。一项全球性裂变材料禁产条约将制止武器级钚和高浓铀的生产，限制现存核武规模，减少恐怖主义组织未来获取裂变材料的危险。
But we must do more than reduce the numbers of our nuclear weapons. We must also reduce the role they play in our security. In this regard, the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review will be a key milestone. It will more accurately calibrate the role, size, and composition of our nuclear stockpile to the current and future international threat environments. And it will provide a fundamental reassessment of U.S. nuclear force posture, levels, and doctrine. Carried out in consultation with our allies, it will examine the role of nuclear weapons in deterring today’s threats and review our declaratory policies with respect to the circumstances in which the United States would consider using nuclear weapons.
但是，我们所必须做的不仅仅是减少我们的核武器数量。我们还必须降低核武器在保障我们的安全中的作用。在这方面，持续进行的《和态势评估报告》（Nuclear Posture Review）将成为重要的里程碑。它将根据当前和未来国际环境中存在的威胁，更准确地调整我们核库存的作用、规模和结构，对美国核武力势态（U.S. Nuclear Force Posture）的级别和方针提出根本性再评估。这项报告将结合与盟国的磋商，检视核武器在今天的威慑作用，审视涉及美国在何种情况下考虑动用核武器的核威慑政策。
As part of the NPR, the Nuclear Posture Review, we are grappling with key questions: What is the fundamental purpose of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal? Will our deterrence posture help the United States encourage others to reduce their arsenals and advance our nonproliferation agenda? How can we provide reassurance to our allies in a manner that reinforces our nonproliferation objectives?
在《核态势评估报告》中，我们将努力回答一些关键问题。美国核武库的根本目的是什么？我们的威慑姿态是否将有助于美国鼓励其他国家减少它们的库存和推动我们的核不扩散议程？我们将如何能够为盟国提供保障而同时推进我们的核不扩散目标？
We believe now is the time for a look — a fresh look at the views on the role of the United States nuclear weapons arsenal. We can’t afford to continue relying on recycled Cold War thinking. We are sincere in our pursuit of a secure peaceful world without nuclear weapons. But until we reach that point of the horizon where the last nuclear weapon has been eliminated, we need to reinforce the domestic consensus that America will maintain the nuclear infrastructure needed to sustain a safe and effective deterrent without nuclear testing.
我们认为，现在应该是对美国核军备的作用作出重新审视的时侯了。我们不能继续依靠翻新的冷战思维。我们真诚追求一个没有核武器的安全、和平的世界。但在达到最后一枚核武器被消除的那一远景目标之前，我们需要强调这样一个内部共识，即美国将为保持一种没有核试验的安全、有效的威慑力而维持必需的核基础设施 So in addition to supporting a robust nuclear complex budget in 2011, we will also support a new Stockpile Management Program that would focus on sustaining capabilities. This is what the military leaders, charged with responsibility for our strategic deterrent, need in order to defend our country. General Chilton, Commander of U.S. STRATCOM, has said repeatedly that he doesn’t need new nuclear weapons capabilities — but he must be confident in the capabilities that we have.
因此，我们除了支持一个强有力的2011年核设施预算案外，还要支持建立一个致力于维持相关能力的新的核武库管理项目。这是肩负战略威慑职责的军事领袖们保家卫国的需要。美国战略司令部（STRATCOM）指挥官奇尔顿（Chilton）上将曾不止一次地表示，他并不需要新的核武器能力，但是必须对我们已拥有的能力有信心。
As we establish that confidence through Stockpile Management, we are making preparations for securing Senate approval for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and working globally to convince other hold-out states to bring that treaty into force. Bringing the treaty into force will strengthen and reenergize the global nonproliferation regime and, in doing so, enhance our own security.
我们正通过库存管理建立这样的信心，与此同时，我们还为争取参议院批准《全面禁止核试验条约》做准备，并在全球范围内积极劝说其他尚未签署的国家促使这项条约生效。这项条约生效有助于全球不扩散体制得到加强并焕发新的活力，从而增强我们本身的安全。
For almost two decades, and over four successive administrations, the United States has observed a moratorium on nuclear testing. So we are already honoring the fundamental obligation of the treaty. A test ban treaty that has entered into force will allow the United States and others to challenge states engaged in suspicious testing activities — including the option of calling on-site inspections to be sure that no testing occurs anywhere. CTBT ratification would also encourage the international community to move forward with other essential nonproliferation steps. And make no mistake, other states — rightly or wrongly — view American ratification of the CTBT as a sign of our commitment to the nonproliferation consensus.
近20年以来，经过连续4届政府，美国始终坚持不进行核试验。因此，我们已经承担了条约的基本义务。禁止核试验条约生效有利于美国及有关方面对从事可疑的核试验活动的国家采取反制措施——包括要求进行现场核查，以保证任何地方都不发生核试验活动。批准《全面禁止核试验条约》还可促使国际社会进而采取其他重要的不扩散行动。毫无疑问，其他国家——无论如何——都会认为美国批准《全面禁止核试验条约》是我们坚持不扩散共识的一个标志。
In coming months, several important events can accelerate progress on our nonproliferation and arms control agenda. In April, President Obama will host a global summit on nuclear security, an unprecedented gathering that will help promote a common understanding of the threat of nuclear terrorism and build international support for effective means of countering that threat. The following month, the NPT Review Conference, held every five years, will seek a consensus among NPT parties on a program of work for strengthening the NPT regime. We hope that these meetings will provide a launching pad for our global efforts to address this challenge.
今后几个月，几项重大的活动有助于我们的不扩散和军备控制议程加速取得进展。4月，奥巴马总统将主持全球核安全峰会（Global Summit on Nuclear Security）。 这个前所未有的重要活动有助于增进人们对核恐怖主义威胁的共同认识，同时为采取有效措施抗击这项威胁争取国际社会的支持。此后一个月，每5年举行一次的《不扩散核武器条约》审议大会（NPT Review Conference）将寻求《不扩散核武器条约》缔约国为加强核不扩散体制的工作纲领取得共识。我们希望上述会议为我们应对这个挑战的全球行动提供一个启动平台。
The nuclear threats facing the international community today cannot be overstated. They pose a grave challenge. And as with other global threats, most notably climate change, we are all in the same boat. Unless we act decisively and act now, the situation may deteriorate catastrophically and irreversibly.
国际社会今天面临的核威胁构成了一项严峻的挑战，其严重性不容忽视。与我们面对的其他全球性挑战一样——其中最值得关注的是气候变化问题——大家都在同一条船上。如果我们不采取果断行动，不立即采取行动，形势就可能继续恶化并导致灾难性的后果，造成无法挽回的局面。
Some experts looking at current nuclear threats and the pressures bearing down on the global nonproliferation regime have come to pessimistic conclusions about our nuclear future. They talk about nuclear cascades and terrorists getting their hands on the bomb. According to them, future proliferation is inevitable; stopping it is futile.
目睹当前核威胁以及全球不扩散体制承受的压力，一些专家对我们的核未来得出了悲观的结论。他们谈论核级联（nuclear cascades），声称恐怖分子将掌控核武器。他们认为，未来核扩散是不可避免的，阻止该趋势的努力将是徒劳的。
Further proliferation and nuclear terrorism are not foregone conclusions. These dangers can be impeded and even prevented. But countering these threats requires us to realize that all states have a common interest in reinvigorating the nonproliferation regime — and that all states bear a responsibility in advancing that effort.
进一步扩散与核恐怖主义不是注定要发生的事情。这些危险能够予以抗击甚或消除。但是，要抗击这些威胁，我们必须认识到，在加强不扩散体制方面，所有国家有着共同的利益，所有国家都必须为推动这项努力而承担责任。
Dean Acheson recognized these truths in his day. They have not dimmed with the passage of time. And the United States will do all it can to carry on this work, and ensure that our efforts succeed.
迪安•艾奇逊在他那个时代就认识到这些真理，它们并没有随着时间的推移而褪色。美国将竭尽全力继续这项工作，确保我们的努力获得成功。
As we stand at this new crossroads our path forward is clear. It is a path that leads from the streets of Prague, through the milestones I’ve spoken of today, and eventually, some day, to a world without nuclear weapons.
今天，我们站在这个新的十字路口，我们的前进道路是明确的。这条道路以布拉格的街道为起点，经过我今天讲到的那些里程碑，最终有一天将到达一个没有核武器的世界。
Just as Acheson did in his time, we must meet this challenge by acting boldly, wisely, hopefully, and in concert with other nations. And once again, if we do so, American leadership will ensure our security and the peace of future generations.
正如艾奇逊在他那个时代所做的那样，我们必须勇敢、明智、充满希望地与其他国家一道迎接这一挑战。如果我们这样做，美国将再次发挥领导作用，确保我们这一代人的安全以及子孙后代的和平。
Thank you all very much.
非常感谢大家
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