At the close of World War II, Acheson was serving as Under Secretary of State. Secretary of State — or Secretary of War Henry Stimson was the country’s leading advocate for nuclear arms control. But Stimson had a tough opponent in then-Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who wanted to leverage the United States’s nuclear advantage to the maximum extent possible. Acheson looked beyond the confines of his bureaucracy and joined with the Secretary of War in favor of arms control. He recognized that the world was at a crossroads. And he saw that the United States had an obligation and an interest in working with other nations to curb the spread of the most dangerous weapons in history.
在二战接近尾声时，艾奇逊担任副国务卿。担任国务卿——我是说战争部长（Secretary of War）——的史汀生（Henry Stimson）是美国主张控制核军备的先锋， 但他的主张遭到了时任国务卿的詹姆斯·贝尔纳斯（James F. Byrnes）的坚决反对，因为贝尔纳斯想要最大限度地利用美国的核优势。艾奇逊没有局限于他所在的部门，而是与战争部长共同主张实行军备控制。他认识到世界当时正处在一个十字路口，他认为美国出于义务和利益应当同其他国家一道遏制有史以来最危险的武器的扩散。
Well, today, we find ourselves at yet another crossroads. During the Cold War, we feared an all-out nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. And in October 1962, the world came close. But President Kennedy realized that a nuclear war was profoundly unwinnable. And over time, he and successive administrations took steps to mitigate that risk and curtail the spread of nuclear weapons.
今天，我们处于又一个十字路口。冷战期间，我们担心在美国与苏联之间爆发一场全面核战争。1962年10月，世界就曾濒临这样一场战争的边缘。但是，肯尼迪（Kennedy）总统认识到，在一场核战争中根本不可能有胜利者。随着时间的推移，他和其后历届政府都采取步骤降低这种风险，阻遏核武器的扩散。
We now face a different kind of threat, a threat that is more diffuse and perhaps even more dangerous. The range and intensity of current nuclear proliferation challenges is alarming. The international community failed to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. We are now engaged in diplomatic efforts to roll back this development. Iran continues to ignore resolutions from the United Nations Security Council demanding that it suspend its enrichment activities and live up to those international obligations.
我们今天面临着一种不同的威胁，这一威胁的范围更广，危险性可能更大。当前核扩散问题发展到了令人担心的范围和程度。国际社会未能制止北韩发展核武器。我们目前正为扭转这一变化而进行外交努力。伊朗继续无视联合国安理会要求其停止铀浓缩活动、履行其国际义务的各项决议。
The International Atomic Energy Agency doesn’t have the tools or authority to carry out its mission effectively. We saw this in the institution’s failure to detect Iran’s covert enrichment plant and Syria’s reactor project. Illicit state and non-state proliferation networks are engaging in sensitive nuclear trade and circumventing laws designed to protect us against the export and import of nuclear materials.
国际原子能机构缺乏有效执行其使命的手段或权威。我们可以从该机构未能发现伊朗的秘密浓缩铀工厂和叙利亚的核反应堆项目这样的事实中看到这一点。非法的国家和非国家扩散网正在进行敏感的核交易，规避旨在制止核材料进出口以保护我们的相关法律。
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